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    <title type="html">honeyblog</title>
    <subtitle type="html">A blog on honeypots, honeynets, and more...</subtitle>
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    <updated>2010-03-11T10:40:19Z</updated>
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    <entry>
        <link href="http://honeyblog.org/archives/54-Inspector-Gadget-Automated-Extraction-of-Proprietary-Gadgets-from-Malware-Binaries.html" rel="alternate" title="&quot;Inspector Gadget: Automated Extraction of Proprietary Gadgets from Malware Binaries&quot;" />
        <author>
            <name>Thorsten Holz</name>
                    </author>
    
        <published>2010-03-12T07:09:00Z</published>
        <updated>2010-03-11T10:40:19Z</updated>
        <wfw:comment>http://honeyblog.org/wfwcomment.php?cid=54</wfw:comment>
    
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            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/4-malware" label="malware" term="malware" />
            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/3-paper" label="paper" term="paper" />
    
        <id>http://honeyblog.org/archives/54-guid.html</id>
        <title type="html">&quot;Inspector Gadget: Automated Extraction of Proprietary Gadgets from Malware Binaries&quot;</title>
        <content type="xhtml" xml:base="http://honeyblog.org/">
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                When analyzing malware samples, a human analyst is typically interested in understanding/recovering a specific algorithms of the given sample. In the case of Conficker, for example, she might be interested in extracting the <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/mtc.sri.com/Conficker/index.html#fig-2');"  href="http://mtc.sri.com/Conficker/index.html#fig-2">domain generation algorithm</a> such that she can understand what domains are currently and in the future used by the malware. Or for spam bots, she might be interested in how the malware downloads spam templates, decodes them, and then generates the actual spam messages. Or for bots, she might be interested in understanding how binary updates are downloaded, decoded, and then executed.  <br />
<br />
In each case, the binary itself encodes the algorithm, but it is cumbersome and hard work to understand all of this. Thus it would be useful to have a tool that enables a malware analyst to <em>automatically</em> extract from a given binary sample the relevant algorithm related to a specific task. In a paper that will be presented at the <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/oakland31.cs.virginia.edu/');"  href="http://oakland31.cs.virginia.edu/">31st IEEE Symposium on Security &amp; Privacy</a> we introduce <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.iseclab.org/papers/ieee_sp10_inspector_gadget.pdf');"  href="http://www.iseclab.org/papers/ieee_sp10_inspector_gadget.pdf">Inspector Gadget</a>, a tool that implements exactly this. A gadget encapsulates all code related to a specific task and can be executed in a stand-alone fashion. A <em>gadget player</em> can take a gadget and replay it, for example to determine which domains are currently used by Conficker, or download and decode an update for a bot binary. Furthermore, we introduce an approach to revert gadget based on a enhanced brute-force algorithm: this is useful to understand the effects of malware in detail and we can (in certain cases) also revert obfuscation algorithms, i.e., to understand what data has been exfiltrated by a given sample. The <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.iseclab.org/papers/ieee_sp10_inspector_gadget.pdf');"  href="http://www.iseclab.org/papers/ieee_sp10_inspector_gadget.pdf">full paper</a> has all the details and describes Inspector Gadget in more depth. And if you are interested in the topic, you should also read the paper by Caballero et al. on <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2009/EECS-2009-133.html');"  href="http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2009/EECS-2009-133.html">BCR</a> (paper title is "Binary Code Extraction and Interface Identification for Security Applications").<br />
<br />
<b>Abstract</b>: <br />
Unfortunately, malicious software is still an unsolved problem and a major threat on the Internet. An important component in the fight against malicious software is the analysis of malware samples: Only if an analyst understands the behavior of a given sample, she can design appropriate countermeasures. Manual approaches are frequently used to analyze certain key algorithms, such as downloading of encoded updates, or generating new DNS domains for command and control purposes.<br />
In this paper, we present a novel approach to automatically extract, from a given binary executable, the algorithm related to a certain activity of the sample. We isolate and extract these instructions and generate a so-called gadget, i.e., a stand-alone component that encapsulates a specific behavior. We make sure that a gadget can autonomously perform a specific task by including all relevant code and data into the gadget such that it can be executed in a self-contained fashion.<br />
Gadgets are useful entities in analyzing malicious software: In particular, they are valuable for practitioners, as understanding a certain activity that is embedded in a binary sample (e.g., the update function) is still largely a manual and complex task. Our evaluation with several real-world samples demonstrates that our approach is versatile and useful in practice.<br />
<br />
The full paper is available at <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.iseclab.org/papers/ieee_sp10_inspector_gadget.pdf');"  href="http://www.iseclab.org/papers/ieee_sp10_inspector_gadget.pdf">http://www.iseclab.org/papers/ieee_sp10_inspector_gadget.pdf</a> and will be presented in May at the <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/oakland31.cs.virginia.edu/');"  href="http://oakland31.cs.virginia.edu/">31st IEEE Symposium on Security &amp; Privacy</a>. The paper was joint work with Clemens Kolbitsch, Christopher Kruegel, and Engin Kirda - all members of the <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.iseclab.org/');"  href="http://www.iseclab.org/">International Secure Systems Lab</a>. 
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    </entry>
    <entry>
        <link href="http://honeyblog.org/archives/53-Waledac-Infection-Check.html" rel="alternate" title="Waledac Infection Check" />
        <author>
            <name>Thorsten Holz</name>
                    </author>
    
        <published>2010-03-02T21:29:00Z</published>
        <updated>2010-03-02T21:29:00Z</updated>
        <wfw:comment>http://honeyblog.org/wfwcomment.php?cid=53</wfw:comment>
    
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            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/1-admin" label="admin" term="admin" />
            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/4-malware" label="malware" term="malware" />
    
        <id>http://honeyblog.org/archives/53-guid.html</id>
        <title type="html">Waledac Infection Check</title>
        <content type="xhtml" xml:base="http://honeyblog.org/">
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                <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/twitter.com/sqrtsben');"  href="http://twitter.com/sqrtsben">Ben Stock</a> has implemented a web service to check a given IP address for infection with Waledac, similar to the <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.confickerworkinggroup.org/infection_test/cfeyechart.html');"  href="http://www.confickerworkinggroup.org/infection_test/cfeyechart.html">Conficker Eye Chart</a>. The idea is that we are currently tracking Waledac as part of the take-down effort and thus we have a pretty good overview of the individual bots within the botnet. Therefore we are in a position to determine if we have seen a given IP address in the recent past as a bot, which indicates that this IP address might be related to a Waledac infection. Of course, effects like NAT or DHCP need to be taken into account: if an IP address is not listed, this does not necessarily mean that you are not infected. <br />
<br />
The check is available at <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/mwanalysis.org/waledac/');"  href="http://mwanalysis.org/waledac/">http://mwanalysis.org/waledac/</a>, feedback is welcome!<br />
 
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        </content>
        
    </entry>
    <entry>
        <link href="http://honeyblog.org/archives/52-Waledac-Takedown-Successful.html" rel="alternate" title="Waledac Takedown Successful" />
        <author>
            <name>Thorsten Holz</name>
                    </author>
    
        <published>2010-02-25T14:57:00Z</published>
        <updated>2010-02-27T07:51:03Z</updated>
        <wfw:comment>http://honeyblog.org/wfwcomment.php?cid=52</wfw:comment>
    
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            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/4-malware" label="malware" term="malware" />
    
        <id>http://honeyblog.org/archives/52-guid.html</id>
        <title type="html">Waledac Takedown Successful</title>
        <content type="xhtml" xml:base="http://honeyblog.org/">
            <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
                A few weeks ago, I blogged about our paper "<a href="http://honeyblog.org/archives/44-Walowdac-Analysis-of-a-Peer-to-Peer-Botnet.html">Walowdac – Analysis of a Peer-to-Peer Botnet</a>". The paper provides an overview of the <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.microsoft.com/security/portal/Threat/Encyclopedia/Entry.aspx?Name=Trojan%3aWin32%2fWaledac');"  href="http://www.microsoft.com/security/portal/Threat/Encyclopedia/Entry.aspx?Name=Trojan%3aWin32%2fWaledac">Waledac</a> <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/us.trendmicro.com/imperia/md/content/us/pdf/threats/securitylibrary/infiltrating_the_waledac_botnet_v2.pdf');"  href="http://us.trendmicro.com/imperia/md/content/us/pdf/threats/securitylibrary/infiltrating_the_waledac_botnet_v2.pdf">botnet</a> and its specific aspects compared to Storm Worm and similar peer-to-peer botnets. The paper also contains some measurement results for the botnet like the typical number of online bots and similar statistics.<br />
<br />
In the last couple of days, the situation changed a bit: we worked on an active takedown of the botnet together with experts from Microsoft, Shadowserver, the University of Mannheim, University of Bonn, University of Washington, Symantec and others. The operation is know within Microsoft as "Operation b49" and involved domain takedowns and additional technical countermeasures. Microsoft also did some fantastic work on the legal side, the complaint filed by Microsoft ("<a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.microsoft.com/presspass/events/rsa/docs/Complaint.pdf');"  href="http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/events/rsa/docs/Complaint.pdf">Microsoft Corporation v. John Does 1-27, et. al.</a>") is available online. As a result, the communication infrastructure of Waledac has been disrupted to a certain extent and the botmaster can effectively not send commands to the bots. The <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.sudosecure.net/waledac/index.php');"  href="http://www.sudosecure.net/waledac/index.php">Waledac Tracker</a> by  <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.sudosecure.net/');"  href="http://www.sudosecure.net/">sudosecure.net</a> also shows a nice decline in the number of bots for the last few days. Note, however, that the infected machines are still up and running, thus some clean-up at that side is still necessary...<br />
<br />
You can read more about the story in a blog post by Microsoft: "<a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/microsoftontheissues.com/cs/blogs/mscorp/archive/2010/02/24/cracking-down-on-botnets.aspx');"  href="http://microsoftontheissues.com/cs/blogs/mscorp/archive/2010/02/24/cracking-down-on-botnets.aspx">Cracking Down on Botnets</a>". And I will update the blog with new information once we start to analyze the collected data...<br />
 
            </div>
        </content>
        
    </entry>
    <entry>
        <link href="http://honeyblog.org/archives/51-A-Practical-Attack-to-De-Anonymize-Social-Network-Users.html" rel="alternate" title="&quot;A Practical Attack to De-Anonymize Social Network Users&quot;" />
        <author>
            <name>Thorsten Holz</name>
                    </author>
    
        <published>2010-02-01T15:43:00Z</published>
        <updated>2010-02-03T12:20:51Z</updated>
        <wfw:comment>http://honeyblog.org/wfwcomment.php?cid=51</wfw:comment>
    
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            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/3-paper" label="paper" term="paper" />
    
        <id>http://honeyblog.org/archives/51-guid.html</id>
        <title type="html">&quot;A Practical Attack to De-Anonymize Social Network Users&quot;</title>
        <content type="xhtml" xml:base="http://honeyblog.org/">
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                In the last couple of months, <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.iseclab.org/');"  href="http://www.iseclab.org/">we</a> have worked on a technique to de-anonymize users based on the way they interact with social networks. The idea behind our attack is the fact that the <em>group memberships</em> of a user (i.e., the groups of a social network to which a user belongs) is often sufficient to uniquely identify this user. This means that there are only a few (or in the best case only one) users of a social network that are a member of exactly the same groups. <br />
<br />
The attack scenario is the following: a malicious website wants to de-anonymize a user, i.e., find out the real name and identity of a visitor. The attack is implemented in two phases. In a first phase, we crawl the groups of a social network to determine the members of the different groups. This is our database from which we can generate a <em>group fingerprint</em> per user. In the second phase, we use the well-known technique of <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=147777');"  href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=147777">history</a> <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/jeremiahgrossman.blogspot.com/2006/08/i-know-where-youve-been.html');"  href="http://jeremiahgrossman.blogspot.com/2006/08/i-know-where-youve-been.html">stealing</a> to probe the browser's history for links to group, thus determining the group fingerprint of the visitor. Wen can then compare this fingerprint to our database and de-anonymize the visitor. Even when unique identification is not possible, then the attack might still significantly reduce the size of the set of candidates that the victim belongs to.<br />
<br />
As a proof-of-concept, we implemented the attack for <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.xing.com/');"  href="http://www.xing.com/">XING</a>, a well-known "Social Network for Business Professionals". Please note that this attack is not specific to XING or any other social network - it is generally applicable to different kinds of modern web applications that contain unique links for user that can be probed via history stealing. We crawled the ~7000 public groups of XING and found about 1.8 million members that belong to at least one group. These users are vulnerable to our attack and we have a <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.iseclab.org/people/gilbert/experiment/');"  href="http://www.iseclab.org/people/gilbert/experiment/">demo website</a> to participate in our experiment. Note that this test is only successful if you are a member of XING and a member of at least one group. If you regularly participate in groups the chances are higher that we can successfully de-anonymize you :-)<br />
<br />
The following pictures show the different stages of the proof-of-concept attack:<center><br />
<a class='serendipity_image_link' href='http://honeyblog.org/uploads/stuff/Experiment2.png' target="_blank"><!-- s9ymdb:31 --><img class="serendipity_image_center" width="110" height="85" style="border: 0px; padding-left: 5px; padding-right: 5px;" src="http://honeyblog.org/uploads/stuff/Experiment2.serendipityThumb.png" alt=""  /></a><a class='serendipity_image_link' href='http://honeyblog.org/uploads/stuff/Experiment4.png' target="_blank"><!-- s9ymdb:32 --><img class="serendipity_image_center" width="110" height="85" style="border: 0px; padding-left: 5px; padding-right: 5px;" src="http://honeyblog.org/uploads/stuff/Experiment4.serendipityThumb.png" alt=""  /><br />
</a><a class='serendipity_image_link' href='http://honeyblog.org/uploads/stuff/Experiment5-res.png' target="_blank"><!-- s9ymdb:33 --><img class="serendipity_image_center" width="110" height="85" style="border: 0px; padding-left: 5px; padding-right: 5px;" src="http://honeyblog.org/uploads/stuff/Experiment5-res.serendipityThumb.png" alt=""  /></a><a class='serendipity_image_link' href='http://honeyblog.org/uploads/stuff/Experiment6-res.png' target="_blank"><!-- s9ymdb:34 --><img class="serendipity_image_center" width="110" height="85" style="border: 0px; padding-left: 5px; padding-right: 5px;" src="http://honeyblog.org/uploads/stuff/Experiment6-res.serendipityThumb.png" alt=""  /></a></center><br />
We have published a technical report that summarizes our preliminary results at <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.iseclab.org/papers/sonda-TR.pdf');"  href="http://www.iseclab.org/papers/sonda-TR.pdf">http://www.iseclab.org/papers/sonda-TR.pdf</a>. In the next couple of weeks, we will finish the work on the paper and present our results at the <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/oakland31.cs.virginia.edu/');"  href="http://oakland31.cs.virginia.edu/">31st IEEE Symposium on Security &amp; Privacy</a> in May. A demo of the attack is available at <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.iseclab.org/people/gilbert/experiment/');"  href="http://www.iseclab.org/people/gilbert/experiment/">http://www.iseclab.org/people/gilbert/experiment/</a>. 
            </div>
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    </entry>
    <entry>
        <link href="http://honeyblog.org/archives/50-Data-Set-For-Malware-ClusteringClassification.html" rel="alternate" title="Data Set For Malware Clustering/Classification" />
        <author>
            <name>Thorsten Holz</name>
                    </author>
    
        <published>2010-01-29T13:08:00Z</published>
        <updated>2010-02-01T18:38:35Z</updated>
        <wfw:comment>http://honeyblog.org/wfwcomment.php?cid=50</wfw:comment>
    
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            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/4-malware" label="malware" term="malware" />
            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/3-paper" label="paper" term="paper" />
    
        <id>http://honeyblog.org/archives/50-guid.html</id>
        <title type="html">Data Set For Malware Clustering/Classification</title>
        <content type="xhtml" xml:base="http://honeyblog.org/">
            <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
                About one month ago I blogged about our research on <a href="http://honeyblog.org/archives/42-Automatic-Analysis-of-Malware-Behavior-using-Machine-Learning.html">malware clustering and classification</a>. We have now also released the full data set from our experiments, such that other people can reproduce the results and compare our approach to theirs. You can find all information at <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/pi1.informatik.uni-mannheim.de/malheur/');"  href="http://pi1.informatik.uni-mannheim.de/malheur/">http://pi1.informatik.uni-mannheim.de/malheur/</a>, together with a description of the different data.<br />
<br />
<em>Quick overview of the data</em>:<br />
<blockquote>Our reference data set is extracted from our large database of malware binaries maintained at <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/cwsandbox.org');"  href="http://cwsandbox.org">CWSandbox</a>. The malware binaries have been collected over a period of three years from a variety of sources. From the overall database, we select binaries which have been assigned to a known class of malware by the majority of six independent anti-virus products. We append the overall anti-virus label to the filename of each report. Although anti-virus labels suffer from inconsistency, we expect the selection using different scanners to be reasonable consistent and accurate. To compensate for the skewed distribution of classes, we discard classes with less than 20 samples and restrict the maximum contribution of each class to 300 binaries. The selected malware binaries are then executed and monitored using CWSandbox, resulting in a total of 3.133 behavior reports in MIST format. <br />
<br />
The application data set consists of seven chunks of malware binaries obtained from the anti-malware vendor Sunbelt Software. The binaries correspond to malware collected during seven consecutive days in August 2009 and originate from a variety of sources. Sunbelt Software uses these very samples to create and update signatures for their VIPRE anti-malware product as well as for their security data feed ThreatTrack. The complete test data set consists of 33.698 behavior reports in MIST format. </blockquote><br />
The full technical report is available at <a href="http://honeyblog.org/junkyard/paper/malheur-TR-2009.pdf">http://honeyblog.org/junkyard/paper/malheur-TR-2009.pdf</a>.<br />
<br />
<em>Update</em>: I changed the terms within the description to use the correct description.<br />
 
            </div>
        </content>
        
    </entry>
    <entry>
        <link href="http://honeyblog.org/archives/49-Call-for-Papers-LEET10.html" rel="alternate" title="Call for Papers: LEET'10" />
        <author>
            <name>Thorsten Holz</name>
                    </author>
    
        <published>2010-01-25T08:03:00Z</published>
        <updated>2010-01-25T08:03:00Z</updated>
        <wfw:comment>http://honeyblog.org/wfwcomment.php?cid=49</wfw:comment>
    
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            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/1-admin" label="admin" term="admin" />
            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/2-honeynets" label="honeynets" term="honeynets" />
            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/4-malware" label="malware" term="malware" />
            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/3-paper" label="paper" term="paper" />
    
        <id>http://honeyblog.org/archives/49-guid.html</id>
        <title type="html">Call for Papers: LEET'10</title>
        <content type="xhtml" xml:base="http://honeyblog.org/">
            <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
                The submissions deadline for the 3rd USENIX Workshop on Large-Scale Exploits and Emergent Threats (<a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.usenix.org/events/leet10/');"  href="http://www.usenix.org/events/leet10/">LEET '10</a>) is quickly approaching. Please submit your work by Thursday, February 25, 2010, 11:59 p.m. PST. The full call for papers is available at <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.usenix.org/events/leet10/cfp/');"  href="http://www.usenix.org/events/leet10/cfp/">http://www.usenix.org/events/leet10/cfp/</a>, see an overview below:<br />
<blockquote><b>Topics</b><br />
Now in its third year, LEET continues to provide a unique forum for the discussion of threats to the confidentiality of our data, the integrity of digital transactions, and the dependability of the technologies we increasingly rely on. We encourage submissions of papers that focus on the malicious activities themselves (e.g., reconnaissance, exploitation, privilege escalation, rootkit installation, attack), our responses as defenders (e.g., prevention, detection, and mitigation), or the social, political, and economic goals driving these malicious activities and the legal and ethical codes guiding our defensive responses.<br />
<br />
<b>Overview</b><br />
Information technology (IT) adds $2 trillion annually to the US economy alone. While these technologies have enabled significant global economic growth, they have become rich targets for malicious activity. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) indicated that cyber crime reached an all-time high in 2008; cyber crime now ranks as the FBI's third highest priority, behind such dramatic threats as counter-terrorism and counter-espionage. Much of this malicious activity is driven by economic incentives, but recently we have seen the emergence of highly visible, politically motivated attacks. While the motivations for malicious behavior and the technical mechanisms that enable them remain rich areas of research, it is clear that today our global society is faced with a wide range of cyber criminal activities: spam, phishing, denial of service, click fraud, etc.<br />
<br />
<b>Workshop Format</b><br />
LEET aims to be a true workshop, with the twin goals of fostering the development of preliminary work and helping to unify the broad community of researchers and practitioners who focus on worms, bots, spam, spyware, phishing, DDoS, and the ever-increasing palette of large-scale Internet-based threats. Intriguing preliminary results and thought-provoking ideas will be strongly favored; papers will be selected for their potential to stimulate discussion in the workshop. Each author will have 15 minutes to present his or her work, followed by 15 minutes of discussion with the workshop participants.</blockquote><br />
 
            </div>
        </content>
        
    </entry>
    <entry>
        <link href="http://honeyblog.org/archives/48-Studying-Aspects-of-the-Underground-Economy.html" rel="alternate" title="&quot;Studying Aspects of the Underground Economy&quot;" />
        <author>
            <name>Thorsten Holz</name>
                    </author>
    
        <published>2010-01-20T05:53:00Z</published>
        <updated>2010-01-20T05:53:00Z</updated>
        <wfw:comment>http://honeyblog.org/wfwcomment.php?cid=48</wfw:comment>
    
        <wfw:commentRss>http://honeyblog.org/rss.php?version=atom1.0&amp;type=comments&amp;cid=48</wfw:commentRss>
    
            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/2-honeynets" label="honeynets" term="honeynets" />
            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/4-malware" label="malware" term="malware" />
            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/3-paper" label="paper" term="paper" />
    
        <id>http://honeyblog.org/archives/48-guid.html</id>
        <title type="html">&quot;Studying Aspects of the Underground Economy&quot;</title>
        <content type="xhtml" xml:base="http://honeyblog.org/">
            <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
                Today I gave a  <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.icsi.berkeley.edu/cgi-bin/events/event.pl?ID=000563');"  href="http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/cgi-bin/events/event.pl?ID=000563">talk</a> at the International Computer Science Institute (<a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.icsi.berkeley.edu/about/index.html');"  href="http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/about/index.html">ICSI</a>) that focussed on some of the research I did in the past year. The slides are now <a href="http://honeyblog.org/junkyard/presentations/10_underground-economy_ICSI.pdf">available</a>.<br />
<br />
<b>Abstract</b>:<br />
With the growing digital economy, it comes as no surprise that criminal activities in digital business have lead to a digital underground economy. Because it is such a fast-moving field, tracking and understanding this underground economy is difficult and most information in this area is vague. In this talk, we discuss several approaches to study the structure of these underground markets. In particular, we present a method with which it is possible to directly analyze the amount of data harvested through keylogger-based attacks in a highly automated fashion. Based on real-world data, we can get a glimpse into the digital underground economy. However, many open questions remain that will be discussed in the last part of the talk.<br />
<br />
You can get the slides at <a href="http://honeyblog.org/junkyard/presentations/10_underground-economy_ICSI.pdf">http:///honeyblog.org/junkyard/presentations/10_underground-economy_ICSI.pdf</a>.<br />
 
            </div>
        </content>
        
    </entry>
    <entry>
        <link href="http://honeyblog.org/archives/47-Call-for-Papers-WEIS10.html" rel="alternate" title="Call for Papers: WEIS'10" />
        <author>
            <name>Thorsten Holz</name>
                    </author>
    
        <published>2010-01-18T18:15:00Z</published>
        <updated>2010-01-18T18:15:00Z</updated>
        <wfw:comment>http://honeyblog.org/wfwcomment.php?cid=47</wfw:comment>
    
        <wfw:commentRss>http://honeyblog.org/rss.php?version=atom1.0&amp;type=comments&amp;cid=47</wfw:commentRss>
    
            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/1-admin" label="admin" term="admin" />
            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/3-paper" label="paper" term="paper" />
    
        <id>http://honeyblog.org/archives/47-guid.html</id>
        <title type="html">Call for Papers: WEIS'10</title>
        <content type="xhtml" xml:base="http://honeyblog.org/">
            <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
                I am happy to serve on the program committee of the 9th Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (<a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/weis2010.econinfosec.org/');"  href="http://weis2010.econinfosec.org/">WEIS</a>). The <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/weis2010.econinfosec.org/cfp.html');"  href="http://weis2010.econinfosec.org/cfp.html">Call for Papers</a> is now available. WEIS will take place on June 7-8, 2010 at Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA<br />
<br />
Important dates are:<br />
<ul><li>Submissions due: February 22, 2010</li><li>Notification of acceptance: April 2, 2010</li><li>Workshop: June 7-8, 2010</li></ul><br />
Information security continues to grow in importance, as threats proliferate, privacy erodes, and attackers find new sources of value. Yet the security of information systems depends on more than just technology.  Good security requires an understanding of the incentives and tradeoffs inherent to the behavior of systems and organizations. As society’s dependence on information technology has deepened, policy makers, including the President of the United States, have taken notice.  Now more than ever, careful research is needed to accurately characterize threats and countermeasures, in both the public and private sectors.<br />
<br />
The Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS) is the leading forum for interdisciplinary scholarship on information security, combining expertise from the fields of economics, social science, business, law, policy and computer science. Prior workshops have explored the role of incentives between attackers and defenders, identified market failures dogging Internet security, and assessed investments in cyber-defense. This workshop will build on past efforts using empirical and analytic tools to not only understand threats, but also strengthen security through novel evaluations of available solutions. How should information risk be modeled given the constraints of rare incidence and high interdependence? How do individuals’ and organizations’ perceptions of privacy and security color their decision making?  How can we move towards a more secure information infrastructure and code base while accounting for the incentives of stakeholders? <br />
<br />
The full Call for Papers is available at <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/weis2010.econinfosec.org/cfp.html');"  href="http://weis2010.econinfosec.org/cfp.html">http://weis2010.econinfosec.org/cfp.html</a>.<br />
 
            </div>
        </content>
        
    </entry>
    <entry>
        <link href="http://honeyblog.org/archives/46-Challenge-1-posted-Signed-books-as-prizes!.html" rel="alternate" title="Challenge 1 posted - Signed books as prizes!" />
        <author>
            <name>Thorsten Holz</name>
                    </author>
    
        <published>2010-01-18T07:56:00Z</published>
        <updated>2010-01-18T07:57:51Z</updated>
        <wfw:comment>http://honeyblog.org/wfwcomment.php?cid=46</wfw:comment>
    
        <wfw:commentRss>http://honeyblog.org/rss.php?version=atom1.0&amp;type=comments&amp;cid=46</wfw:commentRss>
    
            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/2-honeynets" label="honeynets" term="honeynets" />
            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/4-malware" label="malware" term="malware" />
    
        <id>http://honeyblog.org/archives/46-guid.html</id>
        <title type="html">Challenge 1 posted - Signed books as prizes!</title>
        <content type="xhtml" xml:base="http://honeyblog.org/">
            <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
                The first challenge of the Honeynet Forensic Challenge 2010 has been posted at <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/honeynet.org/node/504');"  href="http://honeynet.org/node/504">http://honeynet.org/node/504</a>. The task is to analyze a packet capture that was collected by a honeypot. Analyze and answer the following questions:<br />
<ol><li>Which systems (i.e. IP addresses) are involved? (2pts)</li><li>What can you find out about the attacking host (e.g., where is it located)? (2pts) </li><li>How many TCP sessions are contained in the dump file? (2pts)</li><li>How long did it take to perform the attack? (2pts)</li><li>Which operating system was targeted by the attack? And which service? Which vulnerability? (6pts) </li><li>Can you sketch an overview of the general actions performed by the attacker? (6pts) </li><li>What specific vulnerability was attacked? (2pts) </li><li>What actions does the shellcode perform? Pls list the shellcode. (8pts) </li><li>Do you think a Honeypot was used to pose as a vulnerable victim? Why? (6pts) </li><li>Was there malware involved? Whats the name of the malware? (We are not looking for a detailed malware analysis for this challenge) (2pts) </li><li>Do you think this is a manual or an automated attack? Why? (2pts) </li></ol><br />
Get the pcap at <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/honeynet.org/files/attack-trace.pcap_.gz');"  href="http://honeynet.org/files/attack-trace.pcap_.gz">http://honeynet.org/files/attack-trace.pcap_.gz</a>, they were provided together with the questions by Tillmann Werner. Deadline for submissions is Monday, February 1st 2010 at 17:00 EST. There will be some small prizes, among them signed copies of our book "<a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.amazon.com/gp/product/0321336321?ie=UTF8&amp;amp;tag=honeyblogorg-20&amp;amp;linkCode=as2&amp;amp;camp=1789&amp;amp;creative=9325&amp;amp;creativeASIN=0321336321');"  href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0321336321?ie=UTF8&amp;tag=honeyblogorg-20&amp;linkCode=as2&amp;camp=1789&amp;creative=9325&amp;creativeASIN=0321336321">Virtual Honeypots: From Botnet Tracking to Intrusion Detection</a>". Full information is available at <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/honeynet.org/node/504');"  href="http://honeynet.org/node/504">http://honeynet.org/node/504</a>.<br />
 
            </div>
        </content>
        
    </entry>
    <entry>
        <link href="http://honeyblog.org/archives/45-Honeynet-Project-Forensic-Challenge-2010.html" rel="alternate" title="Honeynet Project Forensic Challenge 2010" />
        <author>
            <name>Thorsten Holz</name>
                    </author>
    
        <published>2010-01-12T19:22:00Z</published>
        <updated>2010-01-12T19:23:03Z</updated>
        <wfw:comment>http://honeyblog.org/wfwcomment.php?cid=45</wfw:comment>
    
        <wfw:commentRss>http://honeyblog.org/rss.php?version=atom1.0&amp;type=comments&amp;cid=45</wfw:commentRss>
    
            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/2-honeynets" label="honeynets" term="honeynets" />
    
        <id>http://honeyblog.org/archives/45-guid.html</id>
        <title type="html">Honeynet Project Forensic Challenge 2010</title>
        <content type="xhtml" xml:base="http://honeyblog.org/">
            <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
                Finally, after several years without any <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.honeynet.org/challenges');"  href="http://www.honeynet.org/challenges">Honeynet Project Challenges</a>, there will finally be new <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/honeynet.org/node/503');"  href="https://honeynet.org/node/503">Forensic Challenges</a> starting next Monday (January 18th, 2010). Here is the official announcement:<br />
<blockquote>I am very happy to announce the Honeynet Project Forensic Challenge 2010. The purpose of the Forensic Challenges is to take learning one step farther. Instead of having the Honeynet Project analyze attacks and share their findings, Forensic Challenges give the security community the opportunity to analyze attacks and <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/honeynet.org/papers');"  href="http://honeynet.org/papers">share their findings</a>. In the end, individuals and organizations not only learn about threats, but also learn how to analyze them. Even better, individuals can access the write-ups from other individuals, and learn about new tools and techniques for analyzing attacks. Best of all, the attacks of the Forensic Challenge are attacks encountered in the wild, real hacks, provided by our members.<br />
It has been several years since we provided Forensic Challenges and with the Forensic Challenge 2010, we will provide desperately needed upgrades. The Forensic Challenge 2010 will include a mixture of server-side attacks on the latest operating systems and services, attacks on client-side attacks that emerged in the past few years, attacks on VoiP systems, web applications, etc. At the end of challenge, we will provide a sample solution created by our members using the <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/honeynet.org/project');"  href="http://honeynet.org/project">state-of-the-art tools</a> that are publicly available, such as libemu and dionaea.<br />
The first challenge (of several for 2010) will be posted on our <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/honeynet.org/challenges');"  href="http://honeynet.org/challenges">Forensic Challenges web site</a> on Monday, January 18th 2010. We will be open to submissions for about two weeks and announce the winners by February 15th 2010. This year, we will also award the top three submissions with prizes! Please check the web site on Monday, January 18th 2010 for further details….<br />
<br />
Christian Seifert</blockquote><br />
Full details will be published at <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/honeynet.org/challenges');"  href="http://honeynet.org/challenges">http://honeynet.org/challenges</a>.<br />
<br />
<em>Update</em>: The date was apparently wrong, I corrected it from January 15th to January 18th. 
            </div>
        </content>
        
    </entry>
    <entry>
        <link href="http://honeyblog.org/archives/44-Walowdac-Analysis-of-a-Peer-to-Peer-Botnet.html" rel="alternate" title="Walowdac – Analysis of a Peer-to-Peer Botnet" />
        <author>
            <name>Thorsten Holz</name>
                    </author>
    
        <published>2010-01-03T11:26:00Z</published>
        <updated>2010-01-03T11:28:05Z</updated>
        <wfw:comment>http://honeyblog.org/wfwcomment.php?cid=44</wfw:comment>
    
        <wfw:commentRss>http://honeyblog.org/rss.php?version=atom1.0&amp;type=comments&amp;cid=44</wfw:commentRss>
    
            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/4-malware" label="malware" term="malware" />
            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/3-paper" label="paper" term="paper" />
    
        <id>http://honeyblog.org/archives/44-guid.html</id>
        <title type="html">Walowdac – Analysis of a Peer-to-Peer Botnet</title>
        <content type="xhtml" xml:base="http://honeyblog.org/">
            <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
                <a class='serendipity_image_link' href='http://honeyblog.org/uploads/paper/wordclouds/waledac-wc.png' onclick="F1 = window.open('/uploads/paper/wordclouds/waledac-wc.png','Zoom','height=554,width=822,top=180.5,left=316.5,toolbar=no,menubar=no,location=no,resize=1,resizable=1,scrollbars=yes'); return false;"><!-- s9ymdb:29 --><img class="serendipity_image_left" width="110" height="73" style="float: left; border: 0px; padding-left: 5px; padding-right: 5px;" src="http://honeyblog.org/uploads/paper/wordclouds/waledac-wc.serendipityThumb.png" alt=""  /></a> One of the most interesting botnets of 2009 was Waledac: the botnet implements a peer-to-peer-based communication channel and it can be seen as the successor of Storm Worm, since it implemented many similar ideas (e.g., a very similar language for spam templates was used). The researchers from Trend Micro had published an <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/us.trendmicro.com/imperia/md/content/us/pdf/threats/securitylibrary/infiltrating_the_waledac_botnet_v2.pdf');"  href="http://us.trendmicro.com/imperia/md/content/us/pdf/threats/securitylibrary/infiltrating_the_waledac_botnet_v2.pdf">analysis</a> of the botnet and we also examined the botnet. The result is a paper entitled "<a href="http://honeyblog.org/junkyard/paper/waledac-ec2nd09.pdf">Walowdac - Analysis of a Peer-to-Peer Botnet</a>": instead of passively observing the network, we implemented an active infiltration component. We emulate the protocol of a bot and are able to observe the inner communication aspects of the network. As a result, we obtain an in-depth overview of the botnet that enables us to study different aspects of the network, e.g., efficiency of the spam campaigns or number of active bots. As a small peak of the results, the following pictures shows the number of active bots in different countries on a specific day in August 2009. We can for example observe diurnal patterns and clearly see the effects of timezones on the size of the botnet:<br />
<br />
<center><a class='serendipity_image_link' href='http://honeyblog.org/uploads/paper/unique_20090824.png' onclick="F1 = window.open('/uploads/paper/unique_20090824.png','Zoom','height=1101,width=1989,top=-93,left=-267,toolbar=no,menubar=no,location=no,resize=1,resizable=1,scrollbars=yes'); return false;"><!-- s9ymdb:30 --><img class="serendipity_image_center" width="110" height="61" style="border: 0px; padding-left: 5px; padding-right: 5px;" src="http://honeyblog.org/uploads/paper/unique_20090824.serendipityThumb.png" alt=""  /></a></center><br />
<b>Abstract</b>:<br />
A botnet is a network of compromised machines under the control of an attacker. Botnets are the driving force behind several misuses on the Internet, for example spam mails or automated identity theft. In this paper, we study the most prevalent peer-to-peer botnet in 2009: <em>Waledac</em>. We present our infiltration of the Waledac botnet, which can be seen as the successor of the Storm Worm botnet. To achieve this we implemented a clone of the Waledac bot named <em>Walowdac</em>. It implements the communication features of Waledac but does not cause any harm, i.e., no spam emails are sent and no other commands are executed. With the help of this tool we observed a minimum daily population of 55,000 Waledac bots and a total of roughly 390,000 infected machines throughout the world. Furthermore, we gathered internal information about the success rates of spam campaigns and newly introduced features like the theft of credentials from victim machines.<br />
<br />
The paper was joint work with Ben Stock, Jan Göbel, Markus Engelberth, and Felix C. Freiling. The full paper is available at <a href="http://honeyblog.org/junkyard/paper/waledac-ec2nd09.pdf">http://honeyblog.org/junkyard/paper/waledac-ec2nd09.pdf</a> and it was published at <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/2009.ec2nd.org/');"  href="http://2009.ec2nd.org/">EC2ND 2009</a>.<br />
<br />
 
            </div>
        </content>
        
    </entry>
    <entry>
        <link href="http://honeyblog.org/archives/43-ADSandbox-Sandboxing-JavaScript-to-fight-Malicious-Websites.html" rel="alternate" title="ADSandbox: Sandboxing JavaScript to fight Malicious Websites" />
        <author>
            <name>Thorsten Holz</name>
                    </author>
    
        <published>2009-12-30T13:01:00Z</published>
        <updated>2009-12-28T12:24:52Z</updated>
        <wfw:comment>http://honeyblog.org/wfwcomment.php?cid=43</wfw:comment>
    
        <wfw:commentRss>http://honeyblog.org/rss.php?version=atom1.0&amp;type=comments&amp;cid=43</wfw:commentRss>
    
            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/3-paper" label="paper" term="paper" />
    
        <id>http://honeyblog.org/archives/43-guid.html</id>
        <title type="html">ADSandbox: Sandboxing JavaScript to fight Malicious Websites</title>
        <content type="xhtml" xml:base="http://honeyblog.org/">
            <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
                <a class='serendipity_image_link' href='http://honeyblog.org/uploads/paper/wordclouds/adsandbox-wc.png' onclick="F1 = window.open('/uploads/paper/wordclouds/adsandbox-wc.png','Zoom','height=327,width=849,top=294,left=303,toolbar=no,menubar=no,location=no,resize=1,resizable=1,scrollbars=yes'); return false;"><!-- s9ymdb:28 --><img class="serendipity_image_left" width="110" height="41" style="float: left; border: 0px; padding-left: 5px; padding-right: 5px;" src="http://honeyblog.org/uploads/paper/wordclouds/adsandbox-wc.serendipityThumb.png" alt=""  /></a>Another project we were working on recently is automated analysis of JavaScript: many of the current <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/research.google.com/archive/provos-2008a.pdf');"  href="http://research.google.com/archive/provos-2008a.pdf">drive-by download attacks</a> are triggered by heap-spraying with the help of JavaScript. In order to develop new kinds of honeyclients and to potentially also protect end-users from this threat, we developed a dynamic approach to analyze JavaScript. The basic idea is to instrument a JavaScript interpreter and profile the execution of the code. With the help of certain heuristics, we can then detect malicious code. Full details are available in the <a href="http://honeyblog.org/junkyard/paper/adsandbox-sac10.pdf">paper</a>. The paper itself will appear at the 25th  ACM Symposium On Applied Computing (<a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.acm.org/conferences/sac/sac2010/');"  href="http://www.acm.org/conferences/sac/sac2010/">SAC'10</a>) in March 2010. <br />
<br />
<b>Abstract</b>:<br />
We present ADSandbox, an analysis system for malicious websites that focusses on detecting attacks through JavaScript. Since, in contrast to Java, JavaScript does not have any built-in sandbox concept, the idea is to execute any embedded JavaScript within an isolated environment and log every critical action. Using heuristics on these logs, ADSandbox decides whether the site is malicious or not. In contrast to previous work, this approach combines generality with usability, since the system is executed directly on the client running the web browser before the web page is displayed. We show that we can achieve false positive rates close to 0% and false negative rates below 15% with a performance overhead of only a few seconds, what is a bit high for real time application, but supposes a great potential for future versions of our tool.<br />
<br />
This paper was joint work with Andreas Dewald and Felix C. Freiling. You can get the paper at <a href="http://honeyblog.org/junkyard/paper/adsandbox-sac10.pdf">http://honeyblog.org/junkyard/paper/adsandbox-sac10.pdf</a>.<br />
<br />
 
            </div>
        </content>
        
    </entry>
    <entry>
        <link href="http://honeyblog.org/archives/42-Automatic-Analysis-of-Malware-Behavior-using-Machine-Learning.html" rel="alternate" title="Automatic Analysis of Malware Behavior using Machine Learning" />
        <author>
            <name>Thorsten Holz</name>
                    </author>
    
        <published>2009-12-28T11:15:00Z</published>
        <updated>2009-12-27T12:57:06Z</updated>
        <wfw:comment>http://honeyblog.org/wfwcomment.php?cid=42</wfw:comment>
    
        <wfw:commentRss>http://honeyblog.org/rss.php?version=atom1.0&amp;type=comments&amp;cid=42</wfw:commentRss>
    
            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/5-CWSandbox" label="CWSandbox" term="CWSandbox" />
            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/4-malware" label="malware" term="malware" />
            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/3-paper" label="paper" term="paper" />
    
        <id>http://honeyblog.org/archives/42-guid.html</id>
        <title type="html">Automatic Analysis of Malware Behavior using Machine Learning</title>
        <content type="xhtml" xml:base="http://honeyblog.org/">
            <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
                In the last couple of years, several honeypot solutions to automatically "collect" malware samples were developed. With these tools, it is possible to obtain copies of malware samples without any human interaction. As a result, we are able to collect quite a few malware samples per day, which then also need to be analyzed. Thus, several sandbox solutions were developed that automate the analysis step by performing dynamic, behavior-based analysis. The result of the dynamic analysis is typically a report that summarizes the observed behavior. The next logical step is to use that information to perform malware classification and malware clustering: at the end of that process, we can then obtain information about which samples perform basically the same kind of activity. We can then automatically find variants of well-known threats, identify new malware families, and reduce the manual effort needed to analyze the large number of incoming malware samples.<br />
<br />
<a class='serendipity_image_link' href='http://honeyblog.org/uploads/paper/wordclouds/malware-clustering-wc.png' target="_blank"><!-- s9ymdb:27 --><img class="serendipity_image_left" width="110" height="57" style="float: left; border: 0px; padding-left: 5px; padding-right: 5px;" src="http://honeyblog.org/uploads/paper/wordclouds/malware-clustering-wc.serendipityThumb.png" alt=""  /></a> In the last couple of months, we worked on malware classification and malware clustering. The results are summarized in a <a href="http://honeyblog.org/junkyard/paper/malheur-TR-2009.pdf">technical report</a>. In the article, we introduce a learning-based framework for automatic analysis of malware behavior. To apply this framework in practice, it suffices to collect a large number of malware samples and monitor their behavior using a sandbox environment. By embedding the observed behavior in a vector space, reflecting behavioral patterns in its dimensions, we are able to apply learning algorithms, such as clustering and classification, for analysis of malware behavior. Both techniques are important for an automated processing of malware samples and we show in several experiments that our techniques significantly improve previous work in this area. For example, the concept of prototypes allows for efficient clustering and classification, while also enabling a security researcher to focus manual analysis on prototypes instead of all malware samples. Moreover, we introduce a technique to perform behavior-based analysis in an incremental way that avoids run-time and memory overhead inherent to previous approaches.<br />
<br />
<b>Abstract</b><br />
Malicious software — so called <em>malware</em> — poses a major threat to the security of computer systems. The amount and diversity of its variants render classic security defenses ineffective, such that millions of hosts in the Internet are infected with malware in form of computer viruses, Internet worms and Trojan horses. While obfuscation and polymorphism employed by malware largely impede detection at file level, the dynamic analysis of malware binaries during run-time provides an instrument for characterizing and defending against the threat of malicious software.<br />
In this article, we propose a framework for automatic analysis of malware behavior using machine learning. The framework allows for automatically identifying novel classes of malware with similar behavior (<em>clustering</em>) and assigning unknown malware to these discovered classes (<em>classification</em>). Based on both, clustering and classification, we propose an incremental approach for behavior-based analysis, capable to process the behavior of thousands of malware binaries on a daily basis. The incremental analysis significantly reduces the run-time overhead of current analysis methods, while providing an accurate discovery and discrimination of novel malware variants.<br />
<br />
The full technical report is available at <a href="http://honeyblog.org/junkyard/paper/malheur-TR-2009.pdf">http://honeyblog.org/junkyard/paper/malheur-TR-2009.pd</a>. It was joint work with <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/blog.mlsec.org/');"  href="http://blog.mlsec.org/">Konrad Rieck</a>, <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.omnivora.de/');"  href="http://www.omnivora.de/">Philipp Trinius</a>, and <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/cwse.de/');"  href="http://cwse.de/">Carsten Willems</a>. And the word cloud was generated using <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.wordle.net/');"  href="http://www.wordle.net/">http://www.wordle.net/</a>.<br />
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    </entry>
    <entry>
        <link href="http://honeyblog.org/archives/41-Call-for-Papers-DIMVA-2010.html" rel="alternate" title="Call for Papers: DIMVA 2010" />
        <author>
            <name>Thorsten Holz</name>
                    </author>
    
        <published>2009-12-27T12:01:33Z</published>
        <updated>2009-12-27T12:01:33Z</updated>
        <wfw:comment>http://honeyblog.org/wfwcomment.php?cid=41</wfw:comment>
    
        <wfw:commentRss>http://honeyblog.org/rss.php?version=atom1.0&amp;type=comments&amp;cid=41</wfw:commentRss>
    
            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/1-admin" label="admin" term="admin" />
    
        <id>http://honeyblog.org/archives/41-guid.html</id>
        <title type="html">Call for Papers: DIMVA 2010</title>
        <content type="xhtml" xml:base="http://honeyblog.org/">
            <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
                I am happy to be a member of the program committee for the Seventh Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware &amp; Vulnerability Assessment (<a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/dimva2010.fkie.fraunhofer.de/');"  href="http://dimva2010.fkie.fraunhofer.de/">DIMVA 2010</a>). The <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/dimva2010.fkie.fraunhofer.de/cfp-dimva2010.txt');"  href="http://dimva2010.fkie.fraunhofer.de/cfp-dimva2010.txt">Call for Papers</a> is now available and we are looking forward to review your submissions. DIMVA will take place in Bonn, Germany on July 8-9 2010.<br />
<br />
<ul><li>Deadline for paper submission:                     February 5, 2010</li><br />
<li>Notification of acceptance/rejection:              April    5, 2010</li><br />
<li>Final camera-ready copies due:                     April   26, 2010</li><br />
<li>Conference:                                        July   8-9, 2010</li></ul><br />
The annual  DIMVA conference serves  as a premier forum  for advancing the state  of the art  in intrusion detection, malware  detection, and vulnerability   assessment.    Each   year   DIMVA   brings   together international  experts  from  academia,  industry  and  government  to present and discuss novel research  in these areas. DIMVA is organized by  the special  interest  group Security  -  Intrusion Detection  and Response  (SIDAR)  of  the   German  Informatics  Society  (GI).   The conference  proceedings  will appear in   Springer's  Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS) series.<br />
<br />
DIMVA solicits  submission of high-quality,  original scientific work.<br />
This year we invite two types of paper submissions:<br />
<ul><li> Full  papers, presenting  novel and  mature research  results.  Full papers  are   limited  to  20  pages,  prepared   according  to  the instructions provided  below. They will  be reviewed by  the program committee, and  papers accepted  for presentation at  the conference will be included in the proceedings.</li><br />
<li>Short  papers  (extended   abstracts),  presenting  original,  still ongoing work  that has not yet  reached the maturity  required for a full paper. Short papers are limited to 10 pages, prepared according to the  instructions provided below.  They will also be  reviewed by the program  committee, and papers accepted for  presentation at the conference will be included  in the proceedings (containing Extended Abstract in the title).</li></ul><br />
The full Call for Papers is available at <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/dimva2010.fkie.fraunhofer.de/cfp-dimva2010.txt');"  href="http://dimva2010.fkie.fraunhofer.de/cfp-dimva2010.txt">http://dimva2010.fkie.fraunhofer.de/cfp-dimva2010.txt</a><br />
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    </entry>
    <entry>
        <link href="http://honeyblog.org/archives/40-Know-Your-Tools-Use-Picviz-to-Find-Attacks.html" rel="alternate" title="Know Your Tools: Use Picviz to Find Attacks " />
        <author>
            <name>Thorsten Holz</name>
                    </author>
    
        <published>2009-11-26T10:59:00Z</published>
        <updated>2009-11-26T10:59:00Z</updated>
        <wfw:comment>http://honeyblog.org/wfwcomment.php?cid=40</wfw:comment>
    
        <wfw:commentRss>http://honeyblog.org/rss.php?version=atom1.0&amp;type=comments&amp;cid=40</wfw:commentRss>
    
            <category scheme="http://honeyblog.org/categories/2-honeynets" label="honeynets" term="honeynets" />
    
        <id>http://honeyblog.org/archives/40-guid.html</id>
        <title type="html">Know Your Tools: Use Picviz to Find Attacks </title>
        <content type="xhtml" xml:base="http://honeyblog.org/">
            <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
                A new series of papers is available from the Honeynet Project: "Know Your Tools" deals with specific types of honeypots and explains how to use them. The first paper in this series deals with <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.wallinfire.net/picviz');"  href="http://www.wallinfire.net/picviz">Picviz</a>, a tool to visualize data based on parallel coordinates plots. <br />
<blockquote>Picviz is a parallel coordinates plotter which enables easy scripting from various input (tcpdump, syslog, iptables logs, apache logs, etc..) to visualize data and discover interesting aspects of that data quickly. Picviz uncovers previously hidden data that is difficult to identify with traditional analysis methods.</blockquote><br />
The paper is available at <a onclick="javascript: pageTracker._trackPageview('/extlink/www.honeynet.org/node/499');"  href="http://www.honeynet.org/node/499">http://www.honeynet.org/node/499"</a>.<br />
<br />
<b>Abstract</b>:<br />
This document explains how Picviz can be used to spot attacks. We will use three examples in this paper; analysis of ssh connection logs, demonstration of the graphical interface on network data generated by a port scanner and the use of Picviz command line to discover attacks towards an Apache web server. Picviz can handle large amounts of data, as illustrated by the last example in which two years of raw Apache access logs are analyzed. We will show how we can find attacks that previously have been hidden and discover them in a very short time!<br />
We hope Picviz will make you more efficient in analyzing any kind of log files, including network traffic, and able to spot abnormalities even with large dataset.<br />
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    </entry>

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